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I. INTRODUCTION
For the kingdom of heaven is like a landowner who went out
early in the morning to hire men to work in his vineyard. He
agreed to pay them a denarius for the day and sent them into his
vineyard. About the third hour he went out and saw others
standing in the marketplace doing nothing. He told them, "You
also go and work in my vineyard, and I will pay you whatever is
right." So they went. He went out again about the sixth hour and
the ninth hour and did the same thing. About the eleventh hour
he went out and found still others standing around. He asked
them, "Why have you been standing here all day long doing
nothing?" "Because no one has hired us," they answered. He
said to them, "You also go and work in my vineyard." When
evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman,
"Call the workers and pay them their wages, beginning with the
last ones hired and going on to the first." The workers who were
hired about the eleventh hour came and each received a
denarius. So when those came who were hired first, they
expected to receive more. But each one of them also received a
denarius. When they received it, they began to grumble against
the landowner. "These men who were hired last worked only one
hour," they said, "and you have made them equal to us who have
borne the burden of the work and the heat of the day." But he
answered one of them, "Friend, I am not being unfair to you.
Didn't you agree to work for a denarius? Take your pay and go;
I want to give to the man who was hired last the same as I gave
you. Don't I have the right to do what I want with my own
money? Or are you envious because I am generous?" So the
last will be first, and the first will be last.'
As was apparently the case at the time the parable takes place, the
practice of pay secrecy or pay confidentiality continues to be a contentious
issue in today's workplace. For many years, as illustrated in the parable,
employers have been confronted with the issue of whether to allow
employees to openly discuss their pay, or keep their compensation
information confidential. Survey data indicates that a significant number of
private sector employers in the United States have formal rules prohibiting
employees from discussing their pay with others.2 Furthermore, survey
1. Matthew 20:1-16 (New International Version).
2. Mary Williams Walsh, Workers Challenge Employer Policies on Pay
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data also suggests that although a majority of companies have no formal
policy prohibiting such discussion, more than one-third of them still
maintain such policies.3
Interestingly, these rules continue to be quite prevalent despite the fact
that they have consistently been held by both the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB" or "Board"), 4 and the federal courts as illegal under the
National Labor Relations Act5 ("NLRA" or "Act").6 This rather anomalous
situation has also recently caught the attention of the United States
Congress.7
This article seeks to provide a comprehensive account of doctrinal
issues related to the use of pay secrecy/confidentiality rules ("PSC rules")
under the NLRA. In Part II, we describe what pay secrecy/confidentiality
is and discuss recent survey evidence of their presence in workplaces
across the United States.8  In Part III, we describe the current legal
framework under which PSC rules are evaluated under the NLRA,9 while
in Parts IV and V, we explore various doctrinal issues related to these rules
Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMES July 28, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/
financial/O72800discuss-pay.html (discussing wrongful termination actions brought by
employees who violated employer wage confidentiality policies); see HRnext, More
Employers Ducking Pay Confidentiality Issue: HRnext Survey Shows Many View it As Hot
Potato, at http://www2.hrnext.conVabout/pr/pay-survey.cfm (Apr. 4, 2001) [hereinafter
HRnext survey] (concluding that because of: 1) open compensation systems; 2) younger
employees; and 3) legal problems, less employers prohibit employee wage discussions).
3. See Sacha Cohen, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Pay Confidentiality in the Workplace, at
http://www.cen-chemjobs.org/jobseeker/articles/print/payconfidentiality.html (explaining
the effects of wage confidentiality policies and arguing for open compensation systems).
4. See infra notes 26-58 and accompanying text (explaining the treatment of wage
secrecy under Section 8 of the NLRA and in federal court cases).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-59.
6. Id.
7. See generally, Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 541, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending the
Fair Labor Standards Act anti-retaliation provisions and enhancing penalties for wage
disparities); Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 74, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending the Fair Labor
Standards Act to include an affirmative defense for wage discrimination actions); Wage
Awareness Protection Act, S. 2966, 106th Cong. (2000) (amending the Fair Labor Standards
Act to include a retaliation provision); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 781, 107th Cong.
(2001) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act affirmative defense requirements);
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 77, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act
to enhance enforcement of equal pay requirements); Fair Pay Act of 2001, H.R. 1362, 107th
Cong. (2001) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to require equal pay for equivalent
jobs); Fair Pay Act of 2001, S. 684, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending the Fair Labor Standards
Act to enhance remedies for wage discrimination and prohibit discharge for discussing
employee wages); Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 76, 108th Cong. (2003) (amending the Fair
Labor Standards Act to enhance enforcement of equal pay requirements and allow the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to collect pay information).
8. See infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 27-65 and accompanying text.
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in more detail.1° This leads us to Part VI, where we ponder the future of
PSC rules under the NLRA given current trends in the American
workplace," and Part VII, where we discuss alternative recent legislative
proposals in this area.'2 Part VIII summarizes and concludes our work. 3
II. THE PROBLEM OF PAY CONFIDENTIALITY
A. What are Pay Secrecy/Pay Confidentiality Rules?
Pay secrecy or pay confidentiality rules ("PSC rules") are workplace
rules prohibiting employees from discussing their wages with coworkers.'"
PSC rules are commonly found in employment manuals,'5 or are orally
conveyed to employees at the time of hiring or at some later point in the
employment relationship. 6 There are also variants of the PSC rules that
only apply to confidential information. One example of this is when a
payroll department employee is prohibited from disclosing information
obtained in the course of his or her employment.
7
PSC rules are a subset of a larger set of rules involving prohibitions
imposed by employers on employees' speech. 18 For example, with judicial
approval employers for many years have prohibited employees from
engaging in union solicitation.' 9  Workplace English-only policies,
prohibiting employees from speaking any language other than English
10. See infra notes 66-187 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 188-195 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 196-221 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
14. See Julio D. Burroughs, Pay Secrecy and Performance: The Psychological
Research, 14 COMPENSATION REV. 44, 45 (1982) (discussing the effects of pay
confidentiality rules on employee performance); Paul Thompson & John Pronsky, Secrecy
or Disclosure in Management Compensation?, 18 Bus. HORIZONS 67, 69-74 (1975)
(comparing open and confidential pay systems by studying their effect on two companies).
15. See, e.g., Fredericksburg Glass and Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 173-174 (1997)
(holding pay confidentiality rule found in employee manual a violation of the NLRA).
16. See, e.g., NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding NLRA violations based in part on supervisor statements that employees "were not
allowed to discuss [their] paychecks with anyone.").
17. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 638 (1982) (upholding the
discharge of an employee for releasing confidential information collected and classified as
confidential by the employer).
18. David Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private
Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERK. J. EMP. LAB L. 1, 8-21 (1998)
(describing the restrictions placed on employees in the contemporary workplace).
19. See, e.g., Peyton Packing Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943) (finding no-
solicitation rules during working hours presumptively valid).
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while at work, are another example of workplace speech rules.2 °
B. How Common are PSC Rules?
Over one-third of private sector employers (different rules apply in the
public sector) recently surveyed admitted to having specific rules
prohibiting employees from discussing their pay with coworkers.2' In
contrast, only about 1 in 14 employers have actively adopted a "pay
openness" policy. 2  About fifty-one percent of the employers surveyed
stated that they did not have any specific policy regarding pay secrecy or
21confidentiality issues.
Survey data also suggest that managers are generally predisposed to
24PSC rules. A consistent finding in research dating back to the 1970s is
that a large proportion of managers agree with the use of PSC rules. 25
Available data thus appears to suggest that a significant number of
employers have either a preference for, or have actually instituted specific
PSC rules. In short, it is not an overstatement to suggest that employers
appear to prefer pay secrecy and confidentiality.
What makes the prevalence of these rules so interesting is the fact that
they have been consistently found to be illegal under the NLRA. In Part III
we discuss the legal framework that has been used under the NLRA to deal
26with challenges to PSC rules.
20. See generally, Rafael Gely, Workplace English Only Rules, in 1999 EMPL. L.
UPDATE, 35, 37-63 (Henry H. Perritt, Jr. ed., 1999) (describing English-only rules and the
legal challenges created by them).
21. See HRnext Survey, supra note 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Cohen, supra note 3 ("Whether it's in the employee manual or just a de rigueur part
of corporate culture, many companies frown on employees talking about salaries and
raises.").
25. See Charles M. Futrell & Omer C. Jenkins, Pay Secrecy Versus Pay Disclosure for
Salesmen: A Longitudinal Study, 15 J. MARKETING REs. 214 (1978) ("Most sales managers
contend that peer pay information should not be disclosed to their salesmen."); Walsh, supra
note 2 ("For many managers, including those who do not formally make pay confidential,
the thought of any new law that could set off a wave of freewheeling pay discussions is
disturbing. There are valid reasons, they say, for keeping pay under wraps.").
26. We note that there do not appear to have been any challenges to PSC rules under
any other kind of statute or common law cause of action. A New York Times article
discussed a complaint filed by a temporary female employee in Milwaukee who overheard
fellow male employees talking about their pay. See Cohen, supra note 3. Believing that she
was being paid less than her male coworkers, she complained to her agency. Id. Following
her complaint, a supervisor at the temporary employment agency told employees that they
were not allowed to discuss their pay at work. Id. The female employee filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was ultimately fired.
Id. According to news reports, the EEOC eventually ruled that the employment agency had
engaged in gender discrimination by paying the complainant and other women less than
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The NLRA describes and prohibits a series of unfair labor practices
("ULPs"). 7 ULPs are conduct considered illegal because of their effect on
the substantive rights of employees to self-organize, i.e., "to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
,,21
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection....
Section 8(a) of the Act safeguards these rights by prohibiting certain
employer actions.29 The NLRA also outlaws a number of union ULPs.3 °
A three-part test is applied in Section 8(a)(1) cases generally, and to
PSC rule cases in particular.3 First, it must be determined that the PSC
men doing the same job. It is not clear from the reports, however, what part the pay
confidentiality rule played in the EEOC decision.
27. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000) (prohibiting unfair labor practices for employers
and unions).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
29. Section 8(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer:
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 [29 U.S.C.S. § 157]; (2) to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it... ; (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization ... ; (4) to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or
given testimony under this Act; (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) [29
U.S.C.S. § 159(a)]
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (alterations in original).
30. Section 8(b) makes it an unfair labor practice for labor organizations "(1) to restrain
or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ... ; or (B) an
employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances; (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues... ;
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer... ;" (4) to engage in various forms
of secondary pressure; (5) to negotiate "closed shop" provisions; (6) to negotiate
"featherbedding" provisions; and (7) to engage in organizational and recognitional picketing
under certain circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). Section 8(e) outlaws "hot cargo"
provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e).
31. See Medeco Sec. Locks v. NLRB, 142 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[A]n
independent violation of § 8(a)(1) exists when (1) an employer's action can be reasonably
viewed as tending to interfere with, coerce, or deter (2) the exercise of protected activity,
and (3) the employer fails to justify the action with a substantial and legitimate business
reason that outweighs the employee's § 7 rights."). Some employers' activities have been
found to be so inherently destructive of the employees' Section 7 rights as to be found
illegal irrespective of any balancing (i.e. of any employer's legitimate business reason).
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). We are not aware of any PSC rule cases
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rule adversely affected the employees' Section 7 rights.32 Second, the
employer must advance a "substantial and legitimate business reason" for
her conduct if the rule adversely affected the employees' rights.33 Third,
the Board must then apply a balancing test to determine whether the
employees' Section 7 rights outweigh the employer's business
justification.34 Such a finding will require the Board to conclude that the
PSC rule and its application have violated Section 8(a)(1).
Regarding the first part of the Section 8(a)(1) analysis, the inquiry
focuses on two issues: whether the employees were engaged in concerted
activity, and whether that concerted activity was for mutual aid or
protection.35 Only if both of these factors are met can the employee be
protected under Section 7 of the NLRA.36
The NLRB and the various courts addressing PSC rules have
consistently found that discussion about wages are considered concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection because they are an integral part of
organizational activity. For example, in a recent case the NLRB considered
a PSC rule included in an employee manual. 37 The rule provided that
employees' earnings were "a confidential matter between the employee and
his earnings supervisor," and thus, that any discussions among employees
involving earnings "will result in dismissal and/or disciplinary action at the
supervisor's discretion. 38  The Board upheld the administrative law
judge's finding that the rule violated Section 8(a)(1).
3 9
More typical are situations in which the PSC rule is not contained in
an employment manual, but has been orally and informally communicated
to employees during the course of their employment. In NLRB v. Main
Street Terrace Care Center, an employee was at the time of her hiring told
"'not to tell anyone [how much money she would be making], because it
caused hard feelings, and the management did not want it known, ' ' 40 and
later on "'[t]hat we [employees] were not allowed to discuss our paychecks
with anyone." ' The Sixth Circuit upheld the Board's conclusion that the
oral PSC orders violated the Act.42
Thus, regardless of whether found in employment manuals or
in which the inherently destructive argument has been raised.
32. Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. NLRB, 142 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1998).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 745-46.
36. Id. at 746.
37. See Fredericksburg Glass and Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 165 (1997) (holding a
"no-discussion rule" formalized by the employer was a violation of the NLRA).
38. Id. at 168.
39. Id. at 165.
40. 218 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original).
41. Id. at 535 (alterations in original).
42. Id. at 538.
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informally communicated to employees, the Board has held in a number of
cases that PSC rules inhibit employees' Section 7 rights to engage in
concerted activities for mutual aid and protection.43 As the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals stated: "dissatisfaction due to low wages is the grist on
which concerted activity feeds. Discord generated by what employees
view as unjustified wage differentials also provides the sinew for persistent
concerted action.""
Notice that a central basis of the holdings in these cases is the
principle that the discussion of wages is a concerted activity under Section
7 and thus potentially subject to the protections of the NLRA.45 In Part IV
we explore this question in detail and provide both doctrinal and theoretical
support for the Board's current position.4 6
Once it has been established that the employer's policy interfered with
the employees' Section 7 activity, the employer has the opportunity to
advance a legitimate business justification for the rule.47 The Board will
43. Id. The Board and reviewing courts have also struggled somewhat with cases
involving the issue of whether a PSC rule actually existed. It is very common for PSC rules
to be orally and informally communicated to employees at no specific time in the
employment relationship. For example, in a number of cases employers did not have a
formally written policy, but instead statements were made during the course of the
employment relationship that potentially could have been interpreted as amounting to an
expectation that wage information should not be discussed. See Wilson Trophy Co. v.
NLRB, 989 F.2d 1502, 1506 (8th Cir. 1993) (involving a supervisor's statement to an
employee not to open his paycheck in the warehouse); NLRB v. Certified Grocers of Ill.,
806 F.2d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving a statement by the employer that names,
addresses, and wages were considered to be confidential). The question then becomes in
these circumstances whether there was indeed a PSC rule, which as implemented interfered
with the employees' Section 7 rights.
For example, in NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.
2000), the employer contended that comments made by a manager to two employees that
employees were not allowed to discuss their paychecks with anyone, nor disclose the pay
raises that the employees were receiving, did not establish a rule sufficient to trigger a
NLRA violation. The employer's argument was threefold: 1) the rule was not written or
acknowledged; 2) the manager who made the comment did not have the authority to
promulgate such a rule; and 3) the rule was not enforced. Id. at 538.
The Sixth Circuit rejected all three arguments. Id. Regarding the first argument,
the Court held that whether the rule is oral rather than in writing made no difference to the
8(a)(1) analysis. Id. The Court noted that "any rule prohibiting wage discussions, whether
written or oral, has a tendency to discourage protected" activity, and is thus potentially
illegal under Section 8(a)(1). Id. Similarly, the fact that the rule was not enforced was
irrelevant, since in 8(a)(1) cases, "'the actual effect of a statement is not so important as is
its tendency to coerce."' Id. at 539 (quoting NLRB v. Okun Bros. Shoe Store, Inc., 825
F.2d 102, 107 (6th Cir. 1987).
44. Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1976).
45. The concerted activity requirement satisfies one of the elements of Section 7. In
addition, the activity must be for "the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ..." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
46. See infra notes 66-148 and accompanying text.
47. Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. NLRB, 142 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1998).
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then balance the employer's proffered justification against the employees'
Section 7 rights.48
Surprisingly, employers have in general been rather timid in
advancing possible justifications for the adoption of PSC rules. Employers
have advanced only a single argument to support their claims for
maintaining PSC rules. Employers have continuously argued that PSC
rules are necessary as a way of limiting "jealousies and strife among
employees. 49  The argument is based on the commonsensible
understanding that a differentiation in wages between employees will
generate internal conflicts among them. Employees will observe the wage
difference, but may not have all of the information necessary to evaluate
the justification for the differing wages. This in turn will strain
relationships among employees.
The NLRB and reviewing courts have, however, consistently rejected
this argument. In an often-quoted passage, the Third Circuit held that the
possibility that a discussion over wages may cause conflict among
employees "is not a justifiable business reason to inhibit the opportunity for
an employee to exercise section 7 rights. 50  The Board has found a
legitimate business justification to exist only in cases where employees
have been disciplined for allegedly disclosing wage or other information
that the employer deemed confidential. These cases have involved
employees disclosing not only their own wage information, but the wages
of other employees as well. For example, in International Business
Machines Corp. , the employer required all employees to sign upon hiring
them an agreement not to disclose to anyone outside the company, or to use
52in an area unrelated to company business, any confidential information.
This rule prohibited the distribution of wage data that the employer had
compiled and classified as confidential.53 An employee was terminated
after he had distributed to other employees salary information that he had
received in the course of his employment.54 The Board upheld the
discharge, finding that the employer had advanced a valid business
justification for the PSC rule.55 The Board noted that the employee knew
that the documents at the center of the disclosure had been classified as
confidential, and that he had no reason to believe that the dissemination
48. Id.
49. Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Petitioner's
brief).
50. Id.
51. 265 N.L.R.B. 638 (1982).
52. Id. at 641.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. ld. at 644.
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56was authorized. Thus, under these circumstances, the discharge was
appropriate. The Board, however, refused to give employers the complete
authority to discharge employees in all cases involving dissemination of
confidential information.57
Cases involving confidential information have also raised the issue of
whether rules against the disclosure of confidential information could be
characterized as rules prohibiting wage discussions. In Lafayette Park
Hotel, the Board considered the legality of a statement found in the
employer's employment manual.58 The statement prohibited employees
from "[d]ivulging [h]otel-private information to employees or other
individuals or entities that are not authorized to receive that information. 59
The Board refused to find a violation of Section 8(a)(1), holding that
employees would not reasonably read this rule as prohibiting discussion of
wages and working conditions. 60 Rather, the Board found that employees
would reasonably understand that the rule was designed to protect the
employer's legitimate interest in the confidentiality of its private
information.61
Similarly, in K-Mart & United Food and Commercial Workers Union,
Local 870,62 the Board found that an employee handbook rule, that
mandated that company business documents be considered confidential and
that prohibited disclosure of such information, did not constitute a Section
8(a)(1) violation.63 The Board did not find that such a rule was likely to
"chill" employees' rights by requiring employees who wished to discuss
information about employment terms and conditions to risk discipline, or in
the alternative, to forgo their Section 7 rights. 64 The Board instead held
that the rule found in the employee manual would likely "be reasonably
understood by employees not as restricting discussion of terms and
conditions of employment but, rather, as intended to protect solely the
legitimate confidentiality of the [employer's] private business
information. ,65
Thus, except for cases involving the diffusion of confidential
information, the Board consistently has held that there appears to be no
legitimate business justifications for supporting employers' adoption of
PSC rules. Later in Part V, we probe the Board's position in this area and
56. Id.
57. Id. at 638.
58. 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998).
59. Id. at 826.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 330 N.L.R.B. 263 (1999).
63. Id. at 263.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 263-64.
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suggest some shortcomings with the Board's current analysis.
IV. PAY SECRECY/CONFIDENTIALITY RULES AS INFRINGING ON
PROTECTED EMPLOYEE CONCERTED ACTIVITY
A. Defining Protected Concerted Activity
As noted previously, a threshold issue in deciding the legality of PSC
rules is whether the activity that is affected or potentially affected by the
employer rule is a concerted activity, and thus potentially subject to the
protections of the NLRA.66 In the cases in which the legality of PSC rules
is considered, the Board has held that wage discussions are a concerted
activity.6' Having made this determination, the Board has then consistently
found PSC rules to interfere with the rights of employees to engage in
concerted activity.68 In this section, we explore the rationale for analyzing
wage discussions as a protected concerted activity.
In addition to protecting employees who seek union representation,
Section 7 of the NLRA also protects employees who "engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of ... other mutual aid or
protection ... .,,69 Thus, employees who are not represented by a labor
organization or do not seek such representation may enjoy the protection of
Section 7 as much as a unionized employee. 70 For example, an
unorganized employee who is terminated for distributing union organizing
literature is protected under Section 7. In this sense, Section 7 protection is
broader than protection for union activity.7' The issue of how far to extend
this protection in cases where there is no union organizing activity requires
one to define what is meant by "protected concerted activity."
As the name suggests, protected concerted activity involves two
separate, yet related questions. First, is the employee activity concerted?
Second, is the activity "for mutual aid or protection? 72  Concerted
activities can be activities undertaken together by two or more employees
73
66. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW, 414-15 (1999)
(explaining the expansion of Section 7 protections through the mutual aid and protection
clause).
71. Id. at415.
72. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 (1986) [hereinafter Meyers II]
(explaining the mutual aid and protection standard under the Meyers I definition of
concerted activities).
73. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15 (1962) (holding that seven
employees who walked off their jobs to protest the cold temperatures existing at the shop
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or by one employee on the behalf of others.74 Thus, when two or more
employees together lodge a complaint with a supervisor, such an activity
will meet the requirement of concert under Section 7.75 On the other hand,
when an employee in a non-unionized workplace, acting alone and without
consulting with fellow employees, lodges separate complaints on the same
issue, the concert requirement is not met and the employee can thus be
terminated without violating the NLRA.76
However, there are a number of situations in which an employee
acting alone might meet the concerted activity requirement. The easier
cases involve situations in which an individual employee claims a right
under an existing collective bargaining agreement. The Board, with
Supreme Court approval, has consistently held such activity to involve
concerted action.77 According to the Board, actions taken by individual
employees intended to implement the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement are "but an extension of the concerted activity giving rise to that
agreement. '78
A second type of case involves those situations in which an individual
employee claims an employment right under state or federal law. Initially,
the Board treated these cases as those involving individuals invoking a
collective bargaining right.79  The Board found that the employees'
presumed interest in occupational safety linked with the statutory mandate
for safety in the workplace supported a finding of concerted activity.80
Accordingly, the Board held that "in the absence of any evidence that
fellow employees disavow" the actions of the single employee, there was
"implied consent." 8' This opinion lends credence to the assertion that the
Board at that time supported a broad construction of concerted activity.
floor were engaged in concerted activity).
74. See Esco Elevators, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B 1245 (1985) (finding concerted activity
where a union officer raised a safety complaint on behalf of workplace employees).
75. See Atl.-Pac. Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 52 F.3d 260, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding a
substantial relation to working conditions so as to conclude that there is concerted activity
where a group of employees wrote a group letter protesting the selection of an unpopular
coworker as the new supervisor).
76. See Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 751-52 (4th Cir. 1949)
(refusing to find concerted activity for an employee's circulation of a supervisor removal
petition where it was found that the employee had a personal grudge against the supervisor
and therefore was not acting for the union's mutual aid or protection).
77. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 823 (1984) (finding that
action by one employee to enforce a provision of an existing collective bargaining
agreement amounted to concerted activity).
78. Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519 (1962).
79. See Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975) (holding that an employee was
engaged in protected concerted activity when he filed a complaint with the California
OSHA office).
80. Id. at 1000.
81. Id.
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Concerted activity was to be found where, judging from the subject matter
of the individual employee's claim, it could be reasonably inferred that
such a concern was shared by other employees. 2
However, years later, the Board reversed this broad interpretation. In
Meyers Industries, Inc., an employee refused to drive a truck which had
83been involved in an accident. He did so after having complained to his
employer and to a state transportation agency about a known defect with
the truck.84  The Board held, after denying the employee's claim, that
concerted activity requires the individual employee to act "'with or on the
authority of other employees, and not solely"' on his or her own behalf.85
The Board distinguished cases involving the assertion of a statutory right
from those involving the assertion of a right grounded in a collective
86bargaining agreement. 86 Under this approach, concerted activity will only
be found where an individual employee is, although acting alone, either
trying to initiate group action or acting for or on behalf of other workers
after having discussed the matter with fellow workers. 87 The NLRB thus
generally refuses to find concerted activity where an individual employee
acts on his or her own behalf.
88
In addition to being deemed concerted, activities qualifying for the
protection provided under Section 7 must be directed towards the purpose
of "mutual aid or protection." The Supreme Court has recognized that the
"mutual aid or protection" language in the NLRA is intended to include
activities other than those associated with self-organization and collective
bargaining (which are mentioned specifically in Section 7).89 For instance,
the Court has held that Section 7 covers concerted activities by employees
"in support of employees of employers other than their own," 90 as well as
encompassing activities by employees whose objective is "to improve
terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as
employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer
82. Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 493 (1984) [hereinafter Meyers I].
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885-86 (1986) (finding concerted activity
where an employee brings a group complaint to management).
85. Meyers II at 885 (quoting Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493,497 (1984)).
86. See id. at 888 ("[I]nvocation of employee contract rights is a continuation of an
ongoing process of employee concerted activity, whereas employee invocation of statutory
rights is not").
87. Id. at 885-86.
88. See, e.g., NLRB v. Portland Airport Limousine Co., 163 F.3d 662, 666 (1st Cir.
1998) (finding no concerted activity where employee refused to drive assigned tractor due to
personal safety concerns).
89. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 573-76 (1978) (holding that distribution of
a newsletter discussing right-to-work legislation and minimum wage federal legislation was
a protected activity).
90. Id. at 564.
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relationship. '
The Court, however, has made clear that while broad, there are limits
to the "mutual aid or protection" language of Section 7. According to the
Court, "at some point the relationship [between the activity and the
interests of the employees] becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot
fairly be deemed to come within the 'mutual aid or protection' clause." 9
B. Wage Discussions as Protected Concerted Activity
Both the Board and the various courts of appeals that have dealt with
PSC rules cases have found wage discussions to be protected concerted
activity, and thus have found that PSC rules amount to a Section 8(a)(1)
violation. 93  This determination is made once it is decided that
conversations about wages are concerted activity.94  In this section we
explore in detail the doctrinal foundations of the Board's position.
At first blush, a conversation will clearly appear to be concerted
activity. By definition, a conversation involves at least two individuals: the
speaker and the listener. As such it appears to meet the concertedness
requirement of Section 7. Indeed, the Board and various courts have
recognized for a long time that "a conversation may constitute a concerted
activity although it involves only a speaker and a listener. " 9'
However, the Board also has required that "to qualify as [concerted
activity] it must appear at the very least that [the activity] was engaged in
with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or
that [the activity] had some relation to group action in the interest of the
employees. 96 In so holding, the Board has been particularly concerned
that without a requirement that the activity had the object of initiating,
inducing, or preparing for group action, every conversation by employees
would have come within the ambit of activities protected by the NLRA.97
That view, according to the Board, would be mistaken.98
Conversations might present a somewhat difficult scenario in the
application of the protected concerted activity question. While clearly
involving two or more employees, conversations are subject to the general
91. Id. at 565.
92. Id. at 567-68. The Court left the task of delineating the extent of the "mutual aid or
protection" clause to the Board.
93. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
95. See Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
96. Id. at 685.
97. Id.
98. Id. Although it preceded Meyers I and II, this view of concerted activity was cited
approvingly by the Board in Meyers II. Meyers II, 28 N.L.R.B at 887 (citing Mushroom
Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964)).
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requirement of group action. This requirement can be hard to apply in
some situations, particularly given that the Board has recognized that
Section 7 protections may "extend to concerted activity which in its
inception involves only a speaker and a listener, for such activity is an
indispensable preliminary step to employee self-organization." 99
Consequently, conversations could be concerted activity if they are
intended to invoke group action, even if group action does not immediately
follow from it. On the other hand, if the purpose of the conversation is
only to "advise an individual as to what he could or should do without
involving fellow workers or union representation to protect or improve his
own status or working position, it is an individual, not a concerted, activity,
and, if it looks forward to no action at all, it is more than likely to be mere'griping.'""°°
Often, the Board and reviewing courts have found conversations to be
concerted activity and thus also have found rules prohibiting employees
from engaging in these conversations to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1).
For example, as discussed earlier,'0 ' in NLRB v. Main Street Terrace Care
Center, the Sixth Circuit enforced a Board order finding that an employer's
rule that prohibited employees from discussing their wages with other
employees constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1). 102 The Court was
particularly concerned that such a rule "undoubtedly tends to interfere with
the employees' right to engage in protected concerted activity."'0 3
This same rationale has been applied to rules prohibiting employees
from complaining to clients about working conditions. In Compuware
Corp. v. NLRB, the employer terminated an employee who threatened to
raise concerns he had about his employment conditions at a meeting in
which a client would be present. '4 The Sixth Circuit found that while the
discharged employee had not sought the authorization of coworkers in
complaining to the client, the employee was acting with the purpose of
furthering group goals, and thus was engaged in concerted activity. 0
5
The Court also rejected the employer's argument that the work rule
prohibiting employees from complaining to its clients about working
conditions was valid under Section 7 since it was designed to protect
legitimate employer interests. 10 6 The Court noted that while a rule designed
to protect legitimate employer interests might be valid even if there exists
99. Meyers II, 28 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986) (quoting Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B.
1313, 1314 (1951)).
100. Mushroom Transp. Co., 330 F.2d at 685.
101. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
102. 218 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2000).
103. Id. at 537.
104. 134 F.3d 1285, 1287 (6th Cir. 1998).
105. Id. at 1290.
106. Id.
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an ancillary effect of discouraging participation in protected activities, the
work rule that the employer had adopted was too broad, and thus was likely
to improperly interfere with the employees' right to engage in concerted
activity.' °7
Thus, there appears to be strong doctrinal support for the finding that
rules prohibiting conversations about wages and working conditions
amount to a violation of the NLRA. However, some cases have led to
108contrary results. Consider the situation in Adelphi Institute Inc., where an
employee who had been placed on probation approached a coworker and
inquired if the coworker had ever been placed on probation."°9 The
employee was terminated and then argued that her termination was a
Section 8(a)(1) violation since her conversation with the coworker was
protected concerted activity. ° The Board found against the employee,
holding instead that there had not been concerted activity.' According to
the majority opinion, nothing in the record supported the conclusion that
the employee was initiating, inducing, or preparing for group action when
she asked her coworker if he had ever been on probation." 2
In response to the dissent, which argued that concerted activity could
be found when looking at the subject matter of the conversation," 3 the
majority noted that "[s]ubject matter alone... is not enough to find
concert. ' 14 Similarly, the majority also rejected the dissent's argument
that the fact that the employee was seeking the aid of her coworker in
determining the impact of probation established the concerted nature of her
activity." 5 The majority argued that the record was absent of any indicia
that the purpose of the conversation was as the dissent contended. 16 Thus,
according to the majority, while contacting this particular coworker might
have been an indication of a desire to engage in group action, it was also
consistent with a uniquely personal motive, such as inquiring if the
coworker had anything to do with the disciplinary action." 7 The majority
concluded by noting, "not every discussion of terms and conditions of
107. Id.
108. 287 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1988).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. ld. at 1074.
112. Id. at 1073.
113. Id. at 1075.
114. Id. at 1074.
115. Id. at 1075.
116. Id. at 1074.
117. Id. The ruling in Adelphi is somewhat in tension with the Board's recent
pronouncement in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 92,2000,
where the Board found that unrepresented employees enjoy the right to have a coworker
present at any investigatory interview that the employee reasonably believes might result in
disciplinary action.
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employment constitutes protected concerted activity.
'' 8
More recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit chastised the Board for taking "preposterous" and "not even close"
to a reasonably defensible position in a case involving a challenge to a rule
similar to those discussed above. In Adtranz v. NLRB, the Court considered
a challenge to a rule prohibiting the use of "'abusive or threatening
language to anyone on Company premises"' and making a violation of this
rule punishable with suspension for a first offense and possible termination
for a second offense. "9 The Board had found that the abusive language
provision constituted an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1) and
ordered the employer to rescind the rule. 2° According to the Board, the
rule prohibiting the use of abusive or threatening language had the
threatening potential of chilling the exercise of protected activity."' The
Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board's order.1 22 The Court noted
that the Board was not arguing that such chilling had occurred in the
particular case, nor that the employer had adopted or applied the policy in
order to frustrate or discourage union activity, but instead it argued that the
rule was unlawful on its face. 12 However, the Court found that the same
manual which included the abusive language rule, also made clear that the
employer was trying to maintain a decorous and peaceful workplace by
encouraging an atmosphere of trust, respect and effective
communication. 1 4  Thus, the Court found "preposterous" the Board's
position that a prophylactic rule against abusive and threatening language is
unlawful on its face."2 5 According to the Court, "[i]t defies explanation that
a law enacted to facilitate collective bargaining and protect employees'
right to organize prohibits employers from seeking to maintain civility in
the workplace. 126
However, the Court did recognize that an "uneven or partial
application of a rule against abusive and threatening language" could
constitute an unfair labor practice under some circumstances.12 The Court
also noted that rules barring "false, vicious, profane or malicious
statements about the employer" were more likely to discourage protected
118. Id.
119. 253 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
120. Id. at 24.
121. See Adtranz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 293 (2000)
(concluding that the provision could be interpreted as "barring lawful union organizing
propaganda").
122. Adtranz, 253 F.3d at 28.
123. Id. at 25.
124. Id. at 25.
125. Id. at28.
126. Id. at 28.
127. Id. at 27-28.
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activities, and thus are more likely to amount to an unfair labor practice.
18
Despite decisions like Adelphi and Adtranz, there appears to exist a
robust doctrinal basis supporting the Board's decisions regarding
prohibitions on wage discussions under the NLRA. Under the Act and
under relevant case law, the Board appears to be on firm ground in
concluding that wage conversations are concerted and protected activity
and that absent legitimate business justifications PSC rules violate the
employees' Section 7 rights. In the next section we argue that there are
also strong theoretical reasons supporting the Board's conclusions.
C. Additional Support for the Board's Posture Regarding Pay
Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules
In a sense wages are a very personal matter. As the laborers in the
vineyard parable cited in the introduction illustrates,'29 hypothetically what
others get paid should not be of any relevance to what one gets paid, so
long as what one's wage is in accordance with one's employment contract.
Indeed, neoclassical economists have traditionally argued that individuals
care about their income exclusively in absolute terms, not in relative
terms. 3 ° That is, individuals' utilities depend on the absolute quantities of
their income, not on how those quantities compare with others. 3 This
view is based on the assumption that individuals' preferences are
independent of each other. 112 Individuals are concerned only about their
own welfare and are generally indifferent to the welfare of others.133
However, an alternative view to the neoclassical explanation of
independent preferences has emerged over the last several decades. Both
economists and legal scholars have advanced the theory of relative
preferences.TM This theory provides a framework that recognizes that
128. Id. at 26-27 (emphasis in original).
129. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
130. See Robert H. Frank, Are Workers Paid their Marginal Products? 74 AM. ECON.
REV. 549, 570 (1984) (arguing that in a model that assumes that individual preferences are
relative, the wage structure within a firm must be one in which individuals are not paid their
marginal products); see generally ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN
BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS, 3-38 (1985) (commenting on relative standing,
income increases, and their effect on employee happiness) [hereinafter CHOOSING THE RIGHT
POND].
131. See also Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992)
(developing the implications of the theory of relative position for a number of legal issues).
But see CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND, supra note 130, at 5 ("[A]bundant evidence suggests
that people do in fact care much more about how their incomes are in any absolute sense.").
132. McAdams, supra note 131, at 3.
133. Id.
134. See CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND, supra note 130, at 3-34 (developing the theory that
has come to be known as the theory of relative preferences); McAdams, supra note 13 1, at
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individual preferences can be dependent in the sense that they are measured
relative to one another.1 35  The relative preferences framework has
important implications for our understanding of PSC rules, since it helps us
identify the rationale for the finding that wage discussions are protected
concerted activity. According to the theory of relative preferences,
individuals care a lot about their status in local hierarchies.
136
Consequently, a market is likely to develop for local status. Those that
have strong preferences for status will "pay" for the privilege to be the
highest paid employee by accepting a wage less than their marginal
productivity. 37 Those that do not care about status as much (although they
may have some concern about it) will require a premium for being at the
bottom of the status hierarchy in the form of a wage above their marginal
productivity.
We believe that the theory of relative preferences provides strong
support for the Board's position regarding PSC rules. The existence of
markets for local status, at least in theory, creates a rationale for the need of
employees to have open discussions about wages. To properly evaluate the
tradeoffs that they have made between status and income, employees need
to know their position in the local hierarchy. That is, employees must be
able to make wage comparisons. If employees are not only valuing
absolute levels of compensation, how much I am paid, but also relative
levels of compensation, how much are others paid, it is essential that they
have information about the wages paid to those employees in their local
hierarchies. 1 9
Employees also need to share wage information in order to facilitate
other important tradeoffs. Consider for example the tradeoffs employees
make regarding their consumption of positional vis d vis non-positional
goods. Positional goods are defined as "things whose value depends
relatively strongly on how they compare with things owned by others.1 4°
26-69.
135. See CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND, supra note 130, at 5-7 (outlining the issues brought
upon by relative economic standing).
136. See id. at 30-34 (analyzing evidence which proves that people care less about how
their income compares to persons from other countries).
137. See Frank, supra note 130, at 551 (concluding that the highest paid worker in a firm
earns less than his/her marginal product while the lowest paid worker earns more than
his/her marginal product).
138. Id.
139. Indeed, the employer could be expected to voluntarily disclose that information.
Overall, the wage bill for the employer remains the same-all that is changing is the
distribution of wages inside the firm, but not the total cost of labor. Furthermore by
facilitating the market for local status, better matching between workers' preferences and
jobs occur, resulting in potential efficiency gains for employers.
140. See Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional
Goods, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 101, 101 (1985) [hereinafter Nonpositional Goods].
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Examples of positional goods include cars, houses, and clothing. Non-
positional goods depend less strongly on such comparisons, and include job
safety, savings, and pensions.
14'
Positional goods serve an ability-signaling function. Important
outcomes in social interactions are made based on assessments of other
people's talents and abilities. Since information about talents and abilities
is seldom available, we have to rely instead on other signals, such as the
signals provided by the acquisition of positional goods. Thus, "[w]hen an
individual's ability level cannot be observed directly, such observable
components of his consumption bundle constitute a signal to others about
his total income level, and on average, therefore, about his level of
ability.' 42
The relative preferences framework suggests that in the search for
status, individuals will consume more positional goods than what is
socially optimal, but will be less likely to consume non-positional goods.
The tendency to devote extra resources to the consumption of observable
positional goods, however, is "suboptimal from the point of view of the
population as a whole."'4' This is the case because in the market for social
status, one individual's advancement in a local hierarchy occurs only at the
expense of others falling behind in the same hierarchy. To avoid falling
behind, individuals will spend on positional observable goods, without
affecting the final outcome, since competitors are doing the same.
Ultimately, too many resources are allocated to the consumption of
positional observable goods.' 44
One of the implications of the relative preferences framework is that
individuals will tend to overspend on positional (or observable) goods and
underspend on non-positional (or unobservable) goods. This tendency
arguably will be worse in cases where individuals do not have other ways
of finding information about local status. 145 That is, employees who have
141. Id.
142. Id. at 107.
143. Id. at 108.
144. Id. The same dynamics also help to explain production ceilings, and the negotiation
of safety and health rules. While collectively employees are better off in agreeing to impose
a safety rule, there are individual incentives that prevent this more favorable outcome from
being achieved. See id. at 102-03 (analyzing a table which concludes that mine workers
chose to work in dusty mine conditions rather than collectively impose cleaner working
conditions).
145. See Frank, Nonpositional Goods, supra note 140, at 108 ("The ability-signaling
rationale for imitative behavior suggests that incentives to distort consumption in favor of
observable goods will be inversely related to the amount and reliability of independent
information that exists concerning individual abilities."); see also, CHOOSING THE RIGHT
POND, supra note 130, at 121-42 (discussing the importance of differentiating
characteristics, and the role of the prisoner's dilemma in creating sub-optimal outcomes
when individuals act in their own self-interest).
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complete information about what every employee in the relevant local
hierarchy makes in the form of wages and benefits, do not need to spend
resources in communicating their local status by buying positional goods.
A quick look at the wage rate will do the trick.
Indeed, the difference between unionized and non-unionized
employee compensation packages has been explained from this
perspective. Professor Robert Frank has analyzed the composition of
compensation packages for both unionized and non-unionized employees.
He has hypothesized that the "very existence of the union's administrative
apparatus may facilitate an exchange of information between coworkers
that enhances the likelihood of their being able to form agreements about
how compensation should be allocated between various budget
categories.",146 Indeed, in analyzing estimates of the effect of collective
bargaining on fringe benefits, Professor Frank has found data consistent
with the relative preferences model. According to Professor Frank,
collective bargaining has its largest impact on the amount of money spent
in acquiring life, accident, and health insurance, and in the amount of
money allocated to pensions. 147 These findings are an indication that
cooperative decisions will tend to favor non-positional goods.
148
This analysis suggests that the Board has been right in finding wage
discussions to be a concerted activity. The relative preferences theory tells
us that employee wages are not independent phenomena as the neoclassical
model suggests. Instead, there is an inherent interdependent relationship
surrounding what each worker gets paid. Consequently, employee wage
discussions by their very nature have a collective or concerted dimension.
In short, the ability of employees to engage in wage conversations
with coworkers markedly facilitates economically proper local status
hierarchy tradeoffs by employees. These interdependent tradeoffs by
themselves represent a sort of concerted action that should be protected by
the NLRA. The relative preference theory thus provides additional support
for the Board's position regarding the concerted nature of PSC rules.
146. Frank, Nonpositional Goods, supra note 140, at 111.
147. Id. at 112.
148. The same analysis helps explain the existence of production ceilings and the
negotiation of safety and health rules. See McAdams, supra note 131, at 21-22 (describing
Professor Frank's theory of how government regulations may reduce inefficiencies caused
by the prisoner's dilemma). The prisoner's dilemma is a theory arguing that workers
competing for relative income will sacrifice safety for greater income. Id. at 21.
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V. LEGITIMATE BUSINESS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PAY
SECRECY/CONFIDENTIALITY RULES UNDER THE NLRA
A. Basic Construct
Once the Board finds that employees are involved in protected
concerted activity, the Board allows the employer to advance a legitimate
business justification for the employer's actions. 149 The Board then
balances the employer's business interests and the employees' Section 7
rights in deciding whether the employer's behavior amounted to an unfair
labor practice. "0
As discussed earlier, in defending their adoption of PSC rules,
employers have advanced the jealousy and strife argument 15 -PSC rules
are necessary as a way of limiting "jealousies and strife among
employees."' 152  This argument is based on the commonsensical
understanding that wage differentials will generate internal conflicts among
151employees, particularly where employees do not have the information
necessary to evaluate the justification for the differing wages. 154  The
NLRB and reviewing courts, however, have consistently rejected this
argument.
Are there any other possible arguments that could be advanced by
employers in support of the wide adoption of PSC rules? Based on recent
business management and economics literature, we suggest that a strong
argument could be made in support of PSC rules, at least in certain
situations.
149. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that
jealousy and strife are not justifiable business reasons to intrude upon an employee's
Section 7 rights).
153. See John Case, When Salaries Aren't Secret, 79 HARV. Bus. REv. 37, 39 (2002)
(analyzing a fictional case of a company facing the decision of whether to make salaries
public information); see also, Robert L. Opsahl, Managerial Compensation: Needed
Research, 2 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 208, 212-13 (1967) (arguing that open
pay systems make individual differences too readily apparent leading to negative effects on
group cohesion and satisfaction).
154. See Case, supra note 153, at 48 (explaining the conflicts caused by wage
differentials, particularly where hiring outside the company will require new recruits to get
paid more than current employees); see also George A. Arkerlof & Janet L. Yellen, The
Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment, 105 Q. J. ECON. 255, 264 (1990)
(pointing out the difficulties in explaining the equity of compensation systems to
employees); George T. Milkovich & Philip H. Anderson, Management Compensation and
Secrecy Policies, 25 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 293 (1972) (discussing the over and
underestimating of employee wages and how it plagues their perceptions of pay levels).
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B. PSC Rules and Compensation Systems
Compensation systems are complex mechanisms designed to meet a
variety of goals. For instance, compensation systems play a screening and
sorting function by helping to allocate employees to particular jobs
according to employee preference.1 15 Compensation contracts are also used
as a means of allocating employment-related risks. 1 6  Furthermore,
compensation contracts serve as incentive mechanisms... and fulfill a
monitoring function. 
58
In order to accomplish some or all of these objectives, employers
utilize a variety of tools. For example, the manner in which employees are
paid-by the hour, 159 by salary,16  or by the results 6'-has sorting,
155. See Martin Brown & Peter Philips, The Decline of Piece Rates in California
Canneries: 1890-1960, 25 INDUS. REL. 81, 82 (1986) (describing the sorting effects of the
piece-rate compensation systems in the cannery industry).
156. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Labor Contracts: The Economics of Incentives
and Risk Sharing, in INCENTIVES, COOPERATION, AND RISK SHARING 47, 50 (Haig R.
Nalbantian ed., 1987) (describing risk-sharing elements in employment contracts including
income insurance, guaranteed incomes, and training and moving costs).
157. See Haig R. Nalbantian, Incentive Compensation in Perspective, in INCENTIVES,
COOPERATION, AND RISK SHARING 3, 14 (Haig R. Nalbantian ed., 1987) ("[F]irms [may]
offer employees a premium over general market wages in an effort to provide incentives for
the appropriate supply of labor inputs."); Stacey R. Kole, The Complexity of Compensation
Contracts, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 79, 81-83 (1997) (describing the incentive functions of pay with
respect to managerial compensation).
158. See Nalbantian, supra note 157, at 14 ("Monitoring activity by managers ... is the
primary source of the information used to develop estimators on which rewards are
necessarily based.").
159. Hourly work is directly linked to time at work during a pay period. See Eugene F.
Fama, Time, Salary, and Incentive Payoffs in Labor Contracts, 9 J. LAB. EcON. 25, 25
(1991) (discussing time, typically an hourly wage, as one type of payoff in a labor contract).
Hourly pay incentives are likely to occur under three scenarios. First, to the extent that the
pace of the job is controlled by the employer or dictated by the work situation rather than
controlled by the worker, employers are more likely to rely on hourly pay, since it facilitates
a fixed relationship between time at work and the output produced. Second, hourly pay is
more attractive to employers to the extent that the individual employee's output is
observable by the employer at the time it is produced. Third, hourly pay is more likely to be
used where the job involves tasks in which the duration is certain and easy to predict, since
this predictability makes it possible for the employer to plan staffing and production
requirements. See Sheldon E. Haber & Robert S. Goldfarb, Does Salaried Status Affect
Human Capital Accumulation?, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 322, 326 (1995) (listing three
criteria for identifying job characteristics that make hourly pay alluring to employers).
160. Salary compensation refers to situations where the contract specifies a weekly or
monthly salary. Fama, supra note 159, at 25. Compensation is generally independent of
output and depends primarily on time worked, although pay does not vary strictly from
month to month depending on actual time worked. "A salaried employee is compensated
not for the amount of time spent on the job, but rather for the general value of services
performed." Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1990). But cf 29
C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (2002) (stating that salaried employees cannot have their salaries
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incentive, and monitoring implications. For example, the choice between
form of pay has been argued to be related to decisions regarding the
amount of supervision that is efficient in a particular type of job.
1 62
Compensation based on results, as opposed to as on time worked, is more
likely to take place in situations where it would be too costly to supervise
the employee directly, or where supervision of employee effort is "noisy"
and thus provides little information about the relationship between effort
163and productivity. In these cases, the employer is shifting the risk
associated with fluctuation in income to the employee.' 64 The employee is
accepting this shift on the expectation that she will be able to perform her
job in a more autonomous manner.161
PSC rules are one piece of the entire compensation system adopted by
a particular employer. To the outside observer, it might be difficult to
appreciate what role PSC rules play in helping employers achieve the
objectives of their compensation structures. Eliminating the ability of
employers to utilize PSC rules could have negative efficiency implications.
Consider the possible impact that the prohibition against PSC rules
might have on the implementation of merit-based compensation systems.
Merit-based compensation systems are generally viewed as having a- . 166
positive effect on productivity. The question then becomes, what is the
impact on the use of merit-based compensation systems of PSC rules? Or,
alternatively, are PSC rules necessary for employers to implement effective
merit-based compensation systems?
Jobs and job duties come in all sizes and forms. Some jobs involve
reduced because of "variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed"). See
generally Edward P. Lazear, Salaries and Piece Rates, 59 J. OF Bus. 405, 406-07 (1986)
(identifying the factors that influence the employer's decision of which salary structure
should be used to pay employees).
161. Under result-based compensation (RBC), pay is made proportional to outcome.
RBC utilizes individual or group performance indicators as proxies for labor inputs. See
Nalbantian, supra note 157, at 16 ("Output-based estimators utilize individual or group
performance indicators as surrogate measures of labor inputs."). Among the different types
of RBC systems, piece-rate systems are the most widely known. Id.
162. See Lazear, supra note 160, at 407 (distinguishing workplaces by the difference in
salary structure).
163. See John H. Pencavel, Work Effort, On-the-Job Screening, and Alternative Methods
of Remuneration, in 1 RES. IN LAB. EcON. 225, 232-34 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 1977)
(discussing the wage structure problems faced by an employer that has workers of various
skills).
164. See id. (emphasizing that an employee's income affects that employee's
productivity).
165. See id. at 232-34 (noting that employees may be uncooperative when they believe a
piece-rate incentive system is unfair).
166. See Rafael Gely, Distilling the Essence of Contract Terms: An Anti-Antiformalist
Approach to Contract and Employment Law, 53 FLA. L. REv. 669, 686-90 (2001)
(discussing the incentive function of compensation systems).
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fairly easy tasks, which lend themselves to easy evaluations of
performance. Other jobs, however, involve much more complex tasks,
making it harder to evaluate job performance. For example, as compared
to a production worker in a manufacturing plant, the various aspects that
can be used to evaluate the performance of a scientific researcher working
to develop a new product are significantly harder to formulate.167 In the
case of a production worker, it is likely that both the specific tasks and the
employee's output are observable, making it easy to evaluate
performance. 168 In the case of the researcher, the opposite is true, making
the evaluation of performance a much harder task.
69
Compensation theory tells us that in the case of the factory worker, the
factors used in evaluating performance and the level of compensation are
likely to be objective factors. These factors by definition are more or less
easy to quantify. On the other hand, the evaluation of the performance of
the researcher, and the factors considered in calculating her wages, are
likely to be of a more subjective and informal nature, since the relationship
between job effort and output is less clear than in the factory worker case.
Indeed, we would expect the employer to prefer to use these subjective
factors rather than a rigid formula, in order to have the flexibility necessary
to provide the right amount of incentives depending on the circumstances.
Whether or not employees are allowed to discuss their wages in the
case of a "simple task" job should not affect the ability of management to
implement a merit-based compensation system. The factors used in the
evaluation are objective and easy to verify. The employer should not be
concerned about having employees compare their wages in relation to each
other and to their own productivity.
However, in the case of the more complex jobs, employers might be
less likely to evaluate performance on the basis of some of the more
subjective factors that go into the job under a pay openness system, opting
instead to rely on factors that are objectively measurable. To the extent
that in complex jobs the subjective factors used in evaluating performance
are considered an essential part of implementing a merit based
compensation system, pay openness may prevent reward allocations based
strictly on merit.1 70 Indeed research indicates that organizations unable to
167. See Haber & Goldfarb, supra note 159, at 326 (discussing how job characteristics
affect the selection of compensation systems).
168. Id. at 325-26.
169. Id.
170. See Burroughs, supra note 14, at 48 ("Pay secrecy may also stem from the difficulty
that pay allocators (bosses) have in distributing widely varying rewards, even when
individual performance and effort indicate that this is warranted."); see also Gerald S.
Leventhal et al., Inequity and Interpersonal Conflict: Reward Allocation and Secrecy about
Reward as Methods of Preventing Conflict, 23 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 88, 100
(1972) (finding, in an experimental setting, that under conditions of secrecy individuals in
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evaluate performance objectively will find it economically inefficient to
implement a pay openness system. A critical variable affecting the
decision to establish an open pay system is the ability of management to
clearly measure task performance. 72  Forcing the use of more objective
measures of performance in situations where such performance appraisal
techniques are not appropriate, will likely reduce the set of incentives
necessary for innovation and have a corresponding downward effect on
long-term productivity. 173  In sum, it seems that fairly strong employer
justifications for PSC rules exist in employment situations involving the
use of more subjective performance appraisal standards.
In addition to upsetting the use of merit-based compensation systems,
a ban on PSC rules might interfere with the risk-allocation function of
employment contracts. As mentioned above, compensation systems serve a
risk allocation function. 174  That is, compensation contracts allocate the
risks associated with stochastic factors that could affect variations in
streams of income.17 As part of the various complex arrangements that are
made when entering employment contracts, the parties also "negotiate"
over the allocation of these risks.
17 6
Risk management theory suggests that it is efficient to allocate risk to
the party better able to bear the cost associated with that risk.177 In the
employment context, since employers are generally believed to be risk-
neutral and employees are believed to be risk averse, employers are in a
better position to bear the risk associated with stochastic fluctuations in
income."' Accordingly, we should expect to see employers assume the
charge of allocating pay were more likely to increase the difference between the rewards of
superior and inferior performers).
171. See Thompson & Pronsky, supra note 14, at 72 (concluding, based on survey data,
that managers felt it was difficult to evaluate performance so as to objectively link
performance with rewards).
172. Futrell & Jenkins, supra note 25, at 214 (noting that by misjudging their employees'
wages, managers misconstrue their employees' performance).
173. See Case, supra note 153, at 44 ("One frequently cited problem of such a formal
pay structure is that is doesn't allow for flexibility in a tight job market, where you typically
need to pay a recruitment premium above a job's market value to attract people.").
174. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
175. See Nalbantian, supra note 157, at 14-15 (arguing that monitoring is necessary to
make successful incentive compensation systems); see e.g., Fama, supra note 159, at 42
(explaining various forms of compensation approaches).
176. See Stiglitz, supra note 156, at 54-61 (discussing the ways that employment
contracts address risks).
177. Id. at 50.
178. Id. If employees were not risk averse but were instead risk-neutral, designing an
efficient contract would be a trivial issue. Nalbantian, supra note 157, at 12. Unlike most
employers, employees have a fairly limited ability to diversify their human capital portfolio.
Human capital refers to the investments individuals make which cannot be separated from
their knowledge or skills, such as education. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A
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role of "insurers" of employment-related risks, 7 9 by insuring employees
against the risks associated with income uncertainty. This is accomplished
by properly structuring the compensation arrangements in a way that
reflects the desired share of the burden of risks.80 For example, by
guaranteeing employees a monthly income, the parties are shifting to the
employer the risk associated with month-to-month variations in
productivity.18
Risk-shifting contracts of this kind are not feasible in situations in
which labor can move freely from one firm to another.182 As a result,
workers will only stay with their firms during bad times and then move to
"greener pastures" during good times. Arguably, then without some
restrictions on labor mobility, risk-shifting contracts will probably not be
offered.
Labor mobility can be limited by utilizing so-called "social
conventions" that make it more difficult or costly for employees to move.
PSC rules represent one such social convention, since they can limit the
ability of employees to talk to fellow employees about pay, including
different wage offers other employees have received. Consequently, some
economists have recently argued that companies adopt pay secrecy polices
in order to avoid employee opportunism in risk-shifting compensation
policy situations. s3 Put another away, there seems to be substantial and
legitimate business justifications for PSC rules in situations where
employers and employees have entered into risk-shifting compensation
agreements.
C. Summary
Many U.S. corporations today put considerable effort into designing
employee compensation plans.1 84  Indeed, many companies pay outside
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 15-17 (U.
of Chi. Press 3d ed., 1993).
179. Stiglitz, supra note 156, at 50.
180. See id. (providing ideas for how compensation contracts can be structured so as to
accommodate risks).
181. See id. (suggesting that guaranteed incomes be added to employment contracts so as
to better accommodate risks). Notice that under such an agreement, although the risk is
shifted to the employer, employees, at least in part, are paying for the shift in the burden of
risk by likely accepting a wage rate lower than what otherwise would be the case. Id.
182. See Leif Danziger & Eliakim Katz, Wage Secrecy as a Social Convention, 35 ECON.
INQUIRY 59, 59 (1997) ("[Tlhe role of wage secrecy is to reduce effective labor mobility,
and thereby enhance the feasibility of risk-shifting contracts.").
183. See id. at 60 (describing the different ways in which workers can get higher wage
offers).
184. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et. al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753 (2002) (suggesting an
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compensation consultants to assist them in this endeavor.' 8  Human
resource professionals believe that properly designed employee
compensation programs can represent a source of firm competitive
advantage.
186
PSC rules are one of the elements that could be incorporated as part of
a compensation program. While the discourse in cases challenging PSC
rules has been exclusively focused on the arguably weak "employee
conflict" rationale, employer justifications for PSC rules might become
considerably stronger when PSC rules are understood as being a part of the
larger concept of compensation structures. In a variety of situations, there
seems to be both legitimate and substantial business justifications for PSC
rules, justifications which call into question the broad brush determinations
by the NLRB and the federal courts that PSC rules are illegal.
VI. THE FUTURE OF PAY SECRECY/CONFIDENTIALITY RULES UNDER THE
NLRA
A. Overview
Despite having consistently been found illegal under the NLRA, PSC
rules perplexingly continue to be commonly adopted by employers in
workplaces across the United States. Given that there is no indication that
employers will become less inclined to adopt PSC rules anytime soon, the
question is where do we go from here? In many ways this situation
represents an arguable illustration of the current impotence of the NLRA.
B. The Current Impotence of the NLRA and Chances for Reform
One reason employers may flagrantly disregard the fact that PSC rules
are generally illegal under the NLRA is because they view the law as
impotent, or as Columbia Law Professor Cynthia Estlund has recently put
it, "ossified."' 8 7 Penalties for violating the NLRA are mild at best,188 and
alternative approach to the dominant theory on executive compensation).
185. Id. at789-91.
186. See Barry Gerhart, Compensation Strategy and Organizational Performance, in
COMPENSATION IN ORGANIZATIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 151, 152-53 (Sara
L. Rynes & Barry Gerhart, eds., 2000) (explaining that the effect of compensation strategies
on employee retention, organization costs, and business performance formulates the
business' success).
187. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1530 (2002). Despite increasing labor legislation, there is little collective bargaining
power among workers. But see id. at 1535-36 (finding that only minor changes have been
made to labor laws despite changes in the labor force).
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the vast majority of non-union employees do not realize that the Act
provides them with protection. 8 9  Unions, in their organizing and
representational efforts, are probably the most likely group to bring illegal
PSC rules to light (and to the attention of the NLRB). Yet they play only a
very minor rule in today's private sector workplace. Unions currently
represent only 8.5% of the private sector workforce,' 90 and union private
sector organizational efforts have decreased significantly. 9' In this
context, it makes little sense for employers to spend money in an attempt to
try and develop more economically sophisticated and acceptable
"legitimate" justifications for their use of PSC rules under the NLRA-it is
much easier and efficient to simply ignore the law.
192
The chances of any meaningful reform of the NLRA in this regard are
probably fairly close to zero. The last meaningful legislative attempt to put
teeth into the NLRA was in the 1978-79 Congressional term, and it was
successfully filibustered in the U.S. Senate despite support from a pro-
union Democratic White House and pro-union Democratic majorities in
both houses of Congress.193 Indeed, even attempts to simply give non-
union employees more "notice" of their rights under the NLRA have gone
nowhere. 94 For better or worse, the anomalous situation of PSC rules
188. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
FACT FINDING REPORT 68-73 (1994) [hereinafter Dunlop Commission Report] (reporting
trends in penalties for NLRA violations).
189. See Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at
a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1702-50 (1989)
(evaluating the statutory intent of Section 7 and applying it to case studies which analyze
employee knowledge of their legal rights in labor disputes).
190. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The American Worker: Junior Partner in Success and
Senior Partner in Failure, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 587, 590 (2003) (illustrating the impact of
declining unionization).
191. See Dunlop Commission Report, supra note 188, at 66-68 (examining the decline in
the proportion of the private sector workforce whose conditions of employment are shaped
by collective bargaining).
192. In this sense, economic efficiency might mandate non-conformity with the law. See
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982) ("Managers have no general obligation to avoid
violating regulatory laws when violations are profitable to the firm, because the sanctions
set by the legislature and courts are a measure of how much firms should spend to achieve
compliance"). But see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance With the Law in the
Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1265 (1998) (disputing the notion of economically
"efficient" breaches of the law by arguing that leeways in the law, particularly by corporate
citizens, should not be tolerated).
193. See Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal
Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 792-97 (1979)
(summarizing the variety of ways that the ninety-fifth Congress used labor law reform to
address the problem of election free speech and equal access).
194. See Rulemaking Regarding Union Dues Regulations, Petition of Charles J. Morris
to the NLRB (petition on Feb. 9, 1993) (review still pending) (on file with the University of
Cincinnati College of Law) (asking the NLRB to expand the pending Rulemaking
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under the NLRA represents a pointed illustration of that Act's increasing
irrelevance in today's workplace, an irrelevance which may not change any
time soon.
VII. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
A. Overview
Perhaps in response to the disillusionment with the current status of
the NLRA, PSC rules have recently caught the attention of Congress.
Various legislative proposals have been introduced dealing with the legality
of PSC rules. Interestingly, while all the case law in this area has involved
the NLRA, none of the proposed legislation directly involves that statute.
Instead, Congress has chosen to address the issue of PSC rules through
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1935 ("FLSA"). The
approach Congress has proposed raises a number of very important
questions.
B. The Current Proposals
In the 106th Congress, the 107th Congress, and the 108th Congress,
bills were introduced addressing this subject.' 95 All of the various proposed
bills have taken the form of amending various sections of the Fair Labor
Standards Act 196 ("FLSA"). Collectively, these amendments are known as
the Equal Pay Act of 1963.'9'
Proceeding regarding the Beck rules to include a broad rule providing for the posting of
conspicuous notices which advise employees of their general rights and duties under the
National Labor Relations Act).
195. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 76, 108th Cong. (2003) (amending the Fair Labor
Standards Act to enhance enforcement of equal pay requirements and allow the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to collect pay information); Fair Pay Act of 2001, S.
684, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to enhance remedies for
wage discrimination and prohibit discharge for discussing employee wages); Fair Pay Act of
2001, H.R. 1362, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to require
equal pay for equivalent jobs); Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 77, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending
the Fair Labor Standards Act to enhance enforcement of equal pay requirements); Paycheck
Fairness Act, H.R. 781, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act
affirmative defense requirements); Wage Awareness Protection Act, S. 2966, 106th Cong.
(2000) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to include a retaliation provision); Paycheck
Fairness Act, H.R. 541, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act anti-
retaliation provisions and enhancing penalties for wage disparities); Paycheck Fairness Act,
S. 74, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to include an affirmative
defense for wage discrimination actions).
196. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
197. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (prohibiting wage sex discrimination in wages).
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All of the proposals are very similar with respect to proposed statutory
language. All of the proposals would make it illegal under Section 215 of
the FLSA to discharge or discriminate against any employee because such
employee "has inquired about, discussed, or otherwise disclosed the wages
of the employee or another employee." 98  One proposal that was
introduced by Senator James Jeffords in the 106th Congress was more
detailed in its description of prohibited acts. As with the other bills, the
Jeffords Bill, introduced as the "Wage Awareness Protection Act," made it
illegal for an employer to take any adverse employment action against any
employee for inquiring about or discussing wages.' 99 The Jeffords Bill,
however, also made it illegal for any person "to make or enforce a written
or oral confidentiality policy that prohibits an employee from inquiring
about, discussing, or otherwise disclosing the wages of the employee or
another employee., 200 This additional provision appears to make it per se
illegal for the employer to have a PSC rule, even if there is no history of
enforcing such a rule.
C. What Is Congress Trying to Do?
The Jeffords Bill differed from other proposals in another very
important way: it was narrowly drawn to deal only with the problem of pay
confidentiality. All the other proposed bills dealt with the pay
confidentiality rule as one proposal among a much larger set of proposals.
Indeed, the primary focus of all the other proposals is the problem of pay
differentials between men and women, and the legal framework available
under the Equal Pay Act to establish a violation of that Act. The Equal Pay
Act of 1963 prohibits pay differentials based on sex for employees doing
"equal work... performed under similar working conditions. ' 0 ' The
various legislative proposals would amend the Act and allow for class
action lawsuits with compensatory and punitive damages. 20' The proposed
198. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 77, 107th Cong. § 3(d)(2) (2001); Paycheck Fairness Act,
H.R. 781, 107th Cong. § 3(d)(4) (2001); Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 74, 106th Cong. §
3(d)(2) (1999); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 541, 106th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (1999). Two other
bills have slightly different language. The language in these bills makes it illegal "to
discharge or in any other manner discriminate against, coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any employee or any other person because the employee inquired about,
disclosed, compared, or otherwise discussed the employee's wages or the wages of any
other employee ... " Fair Pay Act of 2001, H.R. 1362, 107th Cong. § 4(7) (2001); Fair Pay
Act of 2001, S. 684, 107th Cong. § 4(7) (2001).
199. Wage Awareness Protection Act, S. 2966, 106th Cong. (2000).
200. See id. at § 2(a)(2).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
202. See, e.g., Fair Pay Act of 2001, S. 684, 107th Cong. § 5(a)(1) (2001) ("Any
employer who violates subsection (d) or (h) of section 6 shall additionally be liable for such
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legislation also would eliminate the same establishment requirement,2 3 and
redefine the defenses available under the statute to employers, making it
204more difficult for employers to explain away pay differentials.
The remarks made by the sponsors of the bills in introducing the
legislation illustrates that Congress' focus was on dealing with the pay
differential issue. For example, in introducing the Fair Pay Act of 2001,
Senator Tom Harkin focused his remarks exclusively on questions of
narrowing the wage gap between men and women and the issue of
occupational segregation.
Millions of women today work in so-called 'women jobs,' as
secretaries, child care workers, social workers and nurses. These
jobs are often 'equivalent' in skills, effort, responsibility and
working conditions to similar jobs dominated by men. But these
women aren't paid the same as the men. Work that women have
201traditionally done continues to be undervalued and underpaid.
This focus on pay discrimination is important because it places into
context current Congressional interests in PSC rules. The various
proposals suggest a concern with the use of PSC rules as a tool that
employers can use to discriminate on the basis of sex. That is, by
prohibiting employees from discussing their pay, employers are in a
position to pay employees differently based on their sex, or other protected
characteristics. As stated by Congresswomen Eleanor Homes Norton, one
of the co-sponsors of the House version of the Fair Pay Act, in a press
release discussing the provisions of the bill, "[t]he most important
provisions include sections to keep employers from gagging employees by
threatening them with sanctions for freely discussing and learning the
wages of their coworkers, enabling women to engage in self-help to
demand wage increases where appropriate....
D. Problems with the Current Proposals
We believe there are two basic problems with the current legislative
proposals dealing with PSC rules: 1) the cursory attempt to relate PSC rules
to discriminatory practices; and 2) the use of the anti-retaliatory provisions
compensatory or punitive damages as may be appropriate").
203. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 77, 107th Cong. § 3(c) (2001).
204. See, e.g., Fair Pay Act of 2001, H.R. 1362, 107' Cong. § 3(a) (2001) (prohibiting
the use of wage differentials in several compensation systems, including seniority systems,
merit systems, and production-based merit systems).
205. 147 CONG. REC. S3351 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
206. Press Release, Office of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Norton and
Harkin Ask GAO to Study Pay Evaluations by 20 States that Have Increased Women's Pay:
Endorse Paycheck Fairness Act for Equal Pay for Equal Work in EPA (June 12, 2001) (on
file with the University of Cincinnati College of Law) (emphasis added).
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of the Equal Pay Act as an avenue to prohibit PSC rules. We address these
two concerns in turn.
As discussed previously, it appears to be the case that the proposed
legislation's primary focus is on addressing issues of sex-based wage
differentials by incorporating a "comparable worth" theory into the Equal
Pay Act. Similar views have been expressed in committee hearings on the
proposed legislation. Female advocacy groups and government officials
have argued that PSC rules keep employees in the dark about
discriminatory discrepancies in their wages and that wage disparities
between men and women are partially based on discriminatory practices
"often hidden behind a veil of confidentiality. 2 °8 The problem with this
argument is that while there appears to be evidence of wage differentials
between men and women not explained by factors other than sex, there
does not, to our knowledge, appear to be any evidence, or theoretical
justification, indicating that PSC rules play any real part in those
differentials. Even assuming arguendo that there is a connection between
PSC rules and discriminatory pay differentials, the proposed legislation
goes much further than necessary in correcting the problem. The key
provisions of the Equal Pay Act are found in Section 6 of the Act. This
provision prohibits workplace sex discrimination caused by the unequal
and disparate payment of wages between members of the opposite sex "for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility. ' 2°  Section 6 exempts, however, pay differentials that
are based on a seniority system, a merit system, "a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production," and differentials "based on
any other factor other than sex.
' 210
The proposed amendments regarding PSC rules, however, are all
framed as amendments not to Section 6 of the Equal Pay Act, but instead to
the anti-retaliation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 1 These
anti-retaliation provisions apply by reference to the Equal Pay Act, and are
a part of the broader FLSA. As should be the case, these anti-retaliation
provisions are very broad and strict since they seek to protect employees in
the exercise of their most important and basic protected rights, such as the
212right to a congressionally-established minimum wage. As with other
statutory anti-retaliation provisions, the FLSA provisions protect
employees against adverse employment actions where the employee has
207. See, e.g, Walsh, supra note 2 ("'Company policies that prohibit employees from
discussing their salaries with co-workers keep them in the dark' about discriminatory
discrepancies.") (quoting Gail S. Shaffer).
208. Id.
209. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2003).
210. Id.
211. 29 U.S.C. § 215(3) (2000).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2003).
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"filed any complaint" or "instituted any proceeding" or "testified... in any
such proceeding" under the statute."' As is also common in anti-retaliation
provisions, these provisions are absolute in the sense that they are not
subject to any defenses. The various amendments, as described above, thus
make it per se illegal for an employer to take any action against an
employee (i.e., to "discharge or in any other matter discriminate against,
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere' 214) "because the employee
inquired about, disclosed, compared, or otherwise discussed the employee's
wages or the wages of any other employee.
215
The importance of placing this prohibition in FLSA's anti-retaliation
section is two-fold. First, the amendments elevate the significance of
conversations among employees regarding their wages to the level of
protection afforded to individuals who decide to file a complaint or
participate in a proceeding under the statute. Given that there might be a
multiplicity of reasons why employees engage in these conversations, some
which might be completely self-serving and devoid of any value to other
employees, it is not clear why the level of protection afforded in those
cases should be the same as the level of protection afforded to employees
216that file a complaint and participate in statutory proceedings.
211
Second, as mentioned previously, there might exist some potentially
"valid" business reasons for the use of PSC rules. Arguably, PSC rules are
necessary to facilitate the adoption and implementation of merit-based
compensation systems, and systems that facilitate very specific risk
allocation schemes. Amending the FLSA to include a broad prohibition
against PSC rules, as the current legislative proposals do, will make it
impossible for employers to operate under a confidentiality scheme. To the
extent that there are positive business reasons for PSC rules, the proposed
legislation could result in large inefficiencies in the United States labor
market.
In sum, proposed congressional legislation dealing with PSC rules
clearly seems to represent overkill. To the extent PSC rules are facially
discriminatory against women (e.g., enforced or applied only to women and
not men) a clear Title VII disparate treatment action would appear to lie.218
213. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000).
214. Fair Pay Act of 2001, S. 684, 107th Cong. § 4(7) (2001).
215. Id.
216. Employees might begin a conversation about wages in order to assess the fairness
of the employer's compensation system. See supra Part IV.B. For entirely individual
reasons not related to any collective action, see Abby Ellin, Want to Stop the Conversation?
Just Mention Your Finances, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at C9 ("'Talking about your
experience of money has everything to do with how you understand professional success,
and with whether you can allow yourself to be happy."') (quoting Pamela York Kleimer).
217. See supra Part V.
218. This type of claim raises the same legal issues raised by cases involving the
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Moreover, if a facially neutral PSC rule is found to have a negative
disparate impact on women a Title VII case can also be brought, although
such a case will likely be somewhat hard to prove." 9 In either situation,
employers will at least be allowed to raise some business justification
defenses for the PSC rules.220  This contrasts considerably from the
proposed legislative approach of making PSC rules per se illegal under the
FLSA.
E. Summary
A variety of bills dealing with PSC rules have recently been
introduced to the U.S. Congress. The gist of all of these bills is to make
PSC rules per se illegal under the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA.
Given the existence of possible business justifications for PSC rules,
however, it appears that the enactment of such proposed legislation would
be quite unwise. Present statutory formulations appear to provide
employees ample opportunity to attack PSC rules when deemed necessary,
while also affording employers the chance to defend the existence of these
rules.
imposition of job requirements applying only to women. See generally Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that a no-marriage rule for
flight attendants violated Title VII); George v. Farmers Elec. Coop., 715 F.2d 175, 177 (5th
Cir. 1983) (finding a Title VII violation where the employer, in applying an anti-nepotism
rule, told the female employee that the decision to terminate her instead of her husband was
made because the plaintiff's husband was "the head of the household").
219. See, e.g., HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 429-34 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of
developing a disparate impact case under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII).
220. For example, in disparate impact cases, the business necessity defense allows the
employer to come forward with evidence that the "challenged [employment] practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000). Courts interpreting the business necessity defense have
generally adopted a fairly strict interpretation. See, e.g., Lanning v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 489 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[A]n employer must demonstrate that its
cutoff measures the minimum qualifications necessary for successful performance of the job
in question."). The defense has been successfully raised in a number of cases. See
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1123-24 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding a fire
department's beard ban despite its acknowledged disproportionate adverse impact on
blacks). Thus, we would expect that under the business necessity standard, employers will
be able to adopt the PSC rule when, for example, disclosing employees' salaries will
compromise the integrity of the compensation system. See generally supra Part V.B.
(discussing the application of PSC rules to compensation systems).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Pay secrecy or confidentiality rules have recently commanded
considerable attention in the legal system and in the popular press. Rules
of this kind have consistently been found to be illegal under the National
Labor Relations Act. Nevertheless, employers in the United States
continue to widely adopt rules of this kind. In this article, we explored the
various doctrinal issues surrounding the regulation of PSC rules. We
analyzed both the "concerted action" and "legitimate business justification"
elements of the test used by the NLRB when deciding challenges to PSC
rules. We found strong support for the Board's consistent finding that
wage discussions amount to concerted activity, and thus that PSC rules
interfere with the Section 7 rights of employees. Regarding the "legitimate
business justification" prong of the Board's test, we noted that employers
have been rather timid in developing arguments to justify the use of PSC
rules. We suggested that at least in certain situations PSC rules should be
permissible. Our analysis shows that there might be valid justifications for
businesses to adopt rules of this kind, justifications which have not been
articulated well in either administrative or federal court cases. Our analysis
also argues against the enactment of any of the recent or current proposals
on the subject in the U.S. Congress, all of which make PSC rules per se
illegal. Making these rules per se illegal despite the fact that they have
very positive economic impacts in a variety of situations makes little sense,
221
especially in times of ongoing national economic uncertainty .
221. For a good review regarding the increased economic uncertainty in the United
States and elsewhere caused by the events of September 11, 2001, see How the World Has
(and Hasn't) Changed, THE EcONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2001, at 11.
